Group Freedom:A Social Mechanism Account by Hindriks, Frank
  




Philosophy of the Social Sciences
DOI:
10.1177/0048393117726172
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2017
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Hindriks, F. (2017). Group Freedom: A Social Mechanism Account. Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
47(6), 410-439. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393117726172
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393117726172
Philosophy of the Social Sciences
2017, Vol. 47(6) 410 –439
© The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav 
DOI: 10.1 77/004839 1 7 261
journals.sagepub.com/home/pos
Article





Many existing defenses of group rights seem to rely on the notion of 
group freedom. To date, however, no adequate analysis of this notion has 
been offered. Group freedom is best understood in terms of processes 
of social categorization that are embedded in social mechanisms. Such 
processes often give rise to group-specific constraints and enablements. 
On the proposed social mechanism account, group rights are demands for 
group freedom. Even so, group rights often serve to eradicate individual 
unfreedom. Furthermore, generic measures sometimes provide the most 
appropriate solution to a problem of group unfreedom.
Keywords
group freedom, group right, liberal multiculturalism, social categorization, 
social mechanism, inscription, ascription, social group
The view that group rights should play an important role in liberal societies 
is widely accepted within contemporary political philosophy. Will Kymlicka 
uses the term “liberal multiculturalism” for this position:
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1Sen (2006, 115) uses the terms “cultural liberty” and “cultural freedom,” and Pierce 
(2012, 59) uses the term “collective freedom”. However, the underlying notions are 
undertheorized. Carter (1999) uses the term “group freedom” to designate the pos-
sibility that a number of individual agents can exercise their individual freedoms in 
conjunction. As any arbitrary collection of individuals can be free as a group in this 
sense, it is only indirectly relevant to the debate on group rights.
He describes it as the view that groups as diverse as ethnic and religious 
minorities, women, and gay people “have a valid claim, not only to tolerance 
and non-discrimination, but also to explicit accommodation, recognition, and 
representation within the institutions of the larger society” (Kymlicka 2001, 
41; see also Patten 2014). Liberal multiculturalists defend group rights rang-
ing from rights to education in one’s native language to exemptions from 
animal slaughtering rules, from affirmative action to representation rights. 
However, despite the emerging consensus concerning the validity of claims 
to such rights, there is no agreement as to exactly which group rights should 
be upheld and why. A natural thought, which seems to be implicit in many 
existing defenses, is that group rights can be justified in terms of group free-
dom. But, as far as I know, the term “group freedom” is used only once in this 
literature. Peter Jones (1999, 354) writes that “group rights are often articu-
lated as demands for group freedom” (he adds that “they are also feared as 
vehicles for group oppression”).1 In this paper, I propose a conception of 
group freedom, and I explain how group rights can be seen as legitimate 
demands for group freedom.
Section 1 addresses the social categorization processes involved in dis-
crimination and identification. I explicate them as processes of ascription 
and inscription (Pierik 2004). Such processes lie at the heart of my analy-
ses of the notions of a social group, a social practice, and that of a social 
mechanism. They prepare the way for what I call “the social mechanism 
account of group freedom” that I present in section 2. Subsequently, I dis-
cuss an alternative proposal—inspired by the accounts of group rights that 
Joseph Raz (1986) and Denise Reaume (1988) defend—according to 
which the distinctive feature of group freedom is that it has a collective 
object such as a public good. My criticisms of this view, which I present in 
section 3, serve a constructive purpose, as they reveal that the scope of the 
social mechanism account suitably aligns with the accounts of group rights 
that I target.
The social mechanism account of group freedom facilitates an answer to 
the question whether group rights can be justified in terms of group unfree-
dom. I argue in section 4 that this is in fact rarely the case. This is due to two 
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features of the social mechanism account: group freedom is nonbivalent and 
value-neutral. Given that group freedom and unfreedom are contraries rather 
than contradictories, group-specific means are not the only means for resolv-
ing a group unfreedom. And when a group unfreedom is eradicated by generic 
means rather than by means of a group right, the resulting situation is one in 
which everyone is free individually irrespective of their group affiliations. 
For instance, gender discrimination can be reduced by targeting biases in the 
job application process rather than by means of positive discrimination. The 
upshot is that, when group unfreedoms are the problem, group rights need not 
be the solution.
Group rights that are justified in terms of the value of culture require an 
appeal to group identification or to group-specific valuations of cultural 
practices. As the social mechanism account is value-neutral, however, 
such valuations do not feature in the definition of group freedom. An 
advantage of this is that the social mechanism account facilitates an unam-
biguous separation of descriptive and normative matters. It implies, how-
ever, that the problem that group rights solve in this case is one of (ordinary) 
individual unfreedom. In order to appreciate why this is, consider a generic 
ban against some practice such as the consumption of peyote or of ritual 
slaughter. In the presence of a generic ban, there is no inscriptive or ascrip-
tive schema that explains why some group is unfree. In contrast, the result-
ing freedoms are due to a social mechanism. Hence, they are group 
freedoms. And they are justified in terms of individual unfreedoms. The 
surprising conclusion is that group unfreedoms rarely justify the introduc-
tion of group freedoms.
1. Freedom, Practices, and Groups
1.1. Kinds of Group Freedom
Freedom can be negative or positive. Negative freedom consists in the 
absence of constraints. Suppose I want to buy groceries, but the store just 
closed. When this happens, I am constrained from entering the store, and 
as such I am unfree to enter it. Being free in the negative sense of the term 
requires the absence of constraints. Positive freedom, in contrast, is a mat-
ter of enablement. Imagine that I am in a wheelchair and the grocery store 
has put in place a ramp that makes it possible for me to enter. In this case, 
I am free to enter the store in the positive sense of the term. Being free in 
this sense requires relevant capacities or resources. When there is no ramp, 
I am unfree in this sense even if no one prevents me from entering the 
store. Similarly, the absence of affordable health care can restrict 
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2See Berlin (1969), Oppenheim (1981), Miller (1983), and Hindriks (2017) for nega-
tive conceptions of freedom. Cohen (1979, 2011), Sen (1985, 1999), Carter (1999), 
Kramer (2003), and Dowding and Van Hees (2007) present positive conceptions of 
freedom. My usage of the term “positive freedom” should be distinguished from that 
of Berlin (1969), who uses it for conceptions of freedom such as autonomy, which 
concern the cognitive or affective capacities an agent has.
3See Jones (1999) for an account of corporate rights.
someone’s positive freedom even if no one prevents her from entering the 
hospital.2
According to Gerald MacCallum (1967), freedom is a three-place relation 
between an agent, an action, and a preventing or enabling condition. This 
provides in principle for three ways of developing a conception of group 
freedom. The first is in terms of group agency. Following Virginia Held 
(1970), Peter French (1984), and Raimo Tuomela (1995), I regard the use of 
a collective decision procedure as the mark of group agency (Hindriks 2008b; 
see also List and Pettit 2011). The freedom of group agents, or corporate 
freedom, has not nearly received the attention it deserves. Arthur I. Applbaum 
(2007) discusses how states can be free. Hindriks (2008a) discusses the con-
ditions under which a group agent is free to perform a joint action.3 As indi-
cated in the introduction, however, the account of group freedom that I 
develop here should be conducive to defending the rights of a wide range of 
groups. This includes the rights that are specific to ethnic and religious 
minorities, as well as those of women and gay people. Such groups need not 
be organized in that they do not need to have the means to make decisions 
together. In light of this, I do not consider corporate freedom here.
Second, the notion of group freedom could be explicated in terms of the 
action that certain agents are free to perform, or in terms of what is called 
“the object of freedom.” Group freedom could, for instance, consist in the 
freedom of a nonorganized collection of individuals to perform an action 
together, such as dancing the tango or celebrating a national holiday 
(Bratman 1992; Gilbert 1989). Alternatively, it could be argued that, in 
analogy to Raz’s (1986) and Reaume’s (1988) conceptions of collective 
rights, group freedom is the freedom to use public or participatory goods. I 
criticize this approach in section 2, arguing that it does not have the proper 
scope for my purposes. It misidentifies some (ordinary) individual free-
doms as group freedoms. Furthermore, it fails to accommodate freedoms 
that really are group freedoms.
The third option is to explicate the notion of group freedom in terms of 
preventing and enabling conditions. An example of a negative group freedom 
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of this kind is the legal exemption that members of the Native Church of 
America enjoy due to which they are free to consume the drug peyote for 
spiritual purposes. A negative group freedom consists in a group-specific 
exemption from a preventing condition. A positive group freedom is due to a 
group-specific enablement. Publicly funded religious schools make religious 
minorities free in this sense to have their children educated according to the 
precepts of their religions.
In section 1.2, I explicate the notion of a group-specific preventing or 
enabling condition in terms of the notion of a social practice. On my concep-
tion of them, social practices are due to social categorization processes. And 
these categorization processes give rise to social groups. In light of this, I 
argue that group freedoms are freedoms that individuals have due to being a 
member of a group. As I see it, the roles that social groups, social practices, 
and group-specific freedom conditions play in the account make it—to use 
Reaume’s (1988) term—sufficiently “groupy.” I should emphasize, however, 
that on my conception of them, group freedoms are held and exercised by 
individuals. In these respects, they are in fact individual freedoms.
I refer to this as “the individual-agency thesis.” Some will balk at the idea 
that group freedom is a kind of individual freedom, even if the relevant indi-
viduals are members of a group. The first argument I offer in response is a 
point of logic. The bearers of freedom are either individual agents or group 
agents. As just discussed, I am not concerned with group agents here. As 
many group rights do not pertain to group agents either, this can hardly be a 
problem. The point to note, however, is that there are no agents other than 
individual and group agents. It follows that the agents of group freedom must 
be individual agents. Non tertium datur.
The second consideration is a companions-in-guilt argument. Some phi-
losophers have embraced the individual-agency thesis about group rights. In 
particular, Kwame Anthony Appiah (2005, 72), David Miller (2002a, 180), 
and Yael Tamir (1993, 45) regard individuals as the bearers of group rights. 
Miller (2002a, 178), for instance, rejects the idea of thinking “of the group 
itself as the bearer of the right” and argues instead that their bearers are “all 
the individuals who make up the group.” He adds that group rights “are given 
to group members by virtue of their membership of the group in question” 
(Miller 2002a, 180).
The third argument concerns the nature of my project. The quest of this 
paper is to formulate an account of group freedom that serves to justify group 
rights such as those mentioned in the introduction. I will argue in section 4 
that an account that satisfies the individual-agency thesis provides for the 
best way to do so. Before I present my account of group freedom in section 
2, I need to introduce the notion of a social practice and that of a social group.
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4This does not mean that accounts such as this one are uncontested. Turner (1994) 
criticizes the notion of a shared social practice and argues that no adequate account 
has been provided for the transmission of social practices, which in this case amounts 
to the transmission of schemas. More recent attempts to account for this include 
Sperber’s (1996) theory of cultural evolution and Hacking’s (1999) theory of clas-
sificatory looping.
5The schema account of social practices is also undemanding in that it is consistent 
with many other theories. For instance, game-theoretic accounts of conventions and 
institutions can be reconstructed in terms of schemas. Hindriks and Guala (2015) 
and Guala and Hindriks (2015) argue that theories such as Lewis’s (1969) theory of 
convention implicitly features rules. According to this theory, the regularity that is a 
convention is specific to a situation S. Hence, the expectations of those who partici-
pate in the convention feature a rule of the form: if S obtains, do X. Such rules can be 
regarded as schemas.
1.2. Social Practices and Social Groups
Social practices are in the first instance recurring activities in which a num-
ber of people regularly engage. They may range from linguistic practices to 
job market practices, from the celebration of a national holiday to hooligan-
ism during European soccer matches. In addition to this, many participants 
in a social practice have a common conception of how the activities are 
performed. At the heart of this conception lies a schema on the basis of 
which people act (Cudd 2006; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Haslanger 2012; 
Sewell 1992; Valian 1999, 2005). The schema specifies a situation and an 
action that the agent typically performs in that situation. Schemas facilitate 
the recurrent performance of the relevant activities. Thus, schemas struc-
ture what people do. People acquire schemas in some process of socializa-
tion. This explains why the schemas on the basis of which different people 
act tend to be similar to one another and overlap in important ways. 
Combining these features results in a conception of social practices as 
recurring schema-based activities.
This schema-based conception of social practices is fairly undemanding, 
which is a virtue in this context.4 For instance, schemas can be explicit mental 
representations. However, they can also be implicit mental associations. 
Implicit schemas can play a useful role in accounting for discrimination 
within various social practices (Gendler 2008).5
The account remains silent about exactly which intentional attitudes are 
involved in social practices, as this is an empirical matter. Participants will 
frequently be mutually aware of the recurrent performance of the relevant 
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6Killmister (2011) makes a roughly parallel distinction between relational and nomi-
nal models of groups.
actions (Tuomela 2002). In some cases, participants might accept a common 
plan and intend to do their parts individually (Shapiro 2011). Activities can 
also be shared in a stronger sense according to which people perform the 
relevant activities in part because others do—they act on the basis of inter-
locking or shared intentions (Bratman 1992). Some social practices are gov-
erned by norms that permit, obligate, or prohibit the relevant activities. Such 
norm-governed social practices are institutions (Tuomela 2002, 156). Group 
rights are normative in the requisite sense. And when they are properly imple-
mented, they entail social practices. Hence, group rights are institutions.
The notion of a schema provides the link between social practices and 
social groups. Processes of social categorization give rise to social groups 
(Stangor, Jhangiani, and Tarry 2014). Any predicate that is distinctive of a 
collection of individuals defines a category. Redheads, left-handed people, 
and insomniacs are categories, even in the absence of a social practice in 
which they feature. A social category, as I use the term, is a category of peo-
ple who play some role in a social practice. The participants in a social prac-
tice typically act on the basis of a common schema that features some activity 
as characteristic for the members of some category. Such schemas give rise 
to classifications and behaviors due to which the members of the category 
come to form a social group.
Some social groups are identified from the outside: they exist due to catego-
rization by others. Others are identified from the inside: they exist due to self-
categorization. Following Roland Pierik (2004), I refer to the former 
categorization as ascription and to the latter as inscription. By extension, I dis-
tinguish between ascriptive and inscriptive schemas, and between ascriptive 
and inscriptive groups.6 Ascriptive schemas specify a way of treating other 
people who belong to a certain category. As a consequence of this differential 
treatment, members of that category form an ascriptive group. Consider people 
with red hair. They are often bullied when they are young. However, when they 
grow older, they—in particular women with red hair—are often regarded as 
particularly attractive. Outsiders identify people as belonging to these catego-
ries and display particular actions toward them. Such differential treatment 
gives rise to ascriptive groups. Gender discrimination on the labor market, for 
instance, contributes to transforming females into women (Haslanger 2012). 
Along the way, females are ascribed certain properties that might be taken to 
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7See Gendler (2008) and Huebner (2009) for accounts of how implicit attitudes can 
influence actions.
explain, for instance, why they are unfit for certain jobs. Those ascriptions pro-
vide the basis for the differential treatment they receive. They might, for 
instance, not be hired for certain jobs even though they are qualified.
Inscriptive schemas attribute features to the members of a category to which 
an agent belongs in an indexical or self-referential way. Furthermore, they moti-
vate those members to participate in certain practices and perform characteristic 
behaviors. Such features and actions are regarded as significant to being a mem-
ber of that category. An important kind of inscriptive group is the social identity 
group. The members of a social identity group self-consciously identify them-
selves as members of a group. Social identity groups play a prominent role in the 
literature on group rights (Miller 2002a, 178-79; Parekh 2000, 156; Sen 2006, 
26-27). Prominent examples include ethnic and religious groups, the members of 
which share certain central convictions and activities with each other. As with 
other inscriptive groups, the activities that the members of social identity groups 
undertake in virtue of their common schemas form social practices. Note that, 
just as ascriptive schemas, inscriptive schemas can be oppressive. Religious peo-
ple might, for instance, oppress members of their group in the name of the views 
they hold. In light of this, Kymlicka (1995, 37) famously argues that, whereas 
external protections are often justified, internal restrictions are not.
In the case of inscriptive groups, the set of people who inscribe features coin-
cides with the set of people to whom those features are attributed. The target 
group and those who target them differ from each other when it comes to ascrip-
tive groups. It is important to note, however, that they may overlap. Perhaps, for 
instance, men are not the only ones who discriminate against women. Those 
doing the ascription can be called “the ascription group.” The point, then, is that 
ascriptive and ascription groups are distinct but may well have members in 
common.
Inscription and ascription are not mutually exclusive. It is possible, for 
instance, that gay people are the target of ascriptive attitudes, and that they 
also share inscriptive attitudes. A number of gay people, for instance, might 
have self-directed beliefs and preferences, and a conception of a common 
way of life. Furthermore, a process of ascription may in fact give rise to 
inscription, or vice versa. David Miller (2002a, 179) observes that “[v]ery 
often what turns a category of people into a group proper is the experience of 
oppression or discrimination.” Note also that inscriptive attitudes need not be 
explicit, nor for that matter positive.7 People sometimes self-ascribe negative 
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8Even so, they exclude others and can, as such, be discriminatory. Consider men who 
favor men because they are men. Women can be excluded as a by-product of such an 
inscriptive schema. (This transforms them into a social category, but not necessarily 
into a social group—as in this case, there need not be any ascriptive or inscriptive 
schemas that pertain to women.) Because it is due to a schema, such discrimination is 
structural rather than incidental (cf. Lippert-Rasmussen 2014).
9People with physical disabilities need not form an ascriptive or an inscriptive group. 
This implies that their unfreedoms need not be group unfreedom of the kind at issue in 
this paper. Note, however, that this leaves open that they are entitled to compensation 
for reasons unrelated to the arguments under consideration.
10Resources are in fact often regarded as an integral part of social practices (Giddens 
1984; Haslanger 2012; Sewell 1992).
stereotypes (Steele 1997). The key point is that the inscriptive attitudes peo-
ple have are significant for who they take themselves to be and bear on their 
behavior in that they trigger actions that constitute social practices.8
As social practices can cut across each other in ways similar to social cat-
egories, the schema-based approach can be used to do justice to intersecting 
identities (Appiah 2005; Haslanger 2012; Sen 2006). Social practices can be 
individuated in a fine-grained way. Hence, the approach does not confine 
people to systems of social practices or cultures that lay constraining claims 
on people’s overall identity.9
So how do social practices affect people’s freedom? The key thing to 
note is that ascriptive and inscriptive schemas give rise to processes of 
exclusion and inclusion. Consider ascriptive schemas. Someone who 
acts on the basis of an ascriptive schema treats members of the ascriptive 
category in a different way from others. For instance, women who are 
discriminated against on the labor market will have a poorer chance of 
getting certain jobs. By being excluded in this way, many women are 
prevented from having such jobs. Thus, they suffer a disadvantage. The 
members of the ascriptive group are constrained or interfered with and 
thereby made unfree. Inscriptive schemas give rise to processes of inclu-
sion—by implication, they exclude nonmembers. They feature actions 
that have significance for the members of the inscriptive category. The 
actions they give rise to constitute social practices. Whereas ascriptive 
schemas modify behavior within a practice, many social practices would 
not even exist if it were not for inscriptive schemas. Many of these prac-
tices will involve resources that would not otherwise be available.10 
Think, for instance, of official forms that are available in a number of 
minority languages. In this way, such practices constitute advantages. 
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11Cudd’s (2006) definition of social groups connects group membership directly to 
freedom. She takes a social group to consist of a collection of individuals “who share 
(or would share under similar circumstances) a set of social constraints on action” 
(Cudd 2006, 44). My definition is formulated instead in terms of the schemas that 
give rise to social constraints (and enablements), and thereby connects social groups 
to freedom indirectly.
They are enabling and make people free (in the positive sense of the 
term).11
2. Social Mechanisms and Group Freedom
2.1. Social Mechanisms
The notion of a social mechanism is useful for explaining exactly how social 
practices can affect people’s freedom. A mechanism is a structured causal 
process (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 50-51). Mechanisms have parts and 
the way a mechanism works depends on how its parts interrelate. Peter 
Hedström (2005, 25) defines the notion of a social mechanism as follows: “A 
social mechanism [is] a constellation of entities and activities that are orga-
nized [not necessarily intentionally] such that they regularly bring about a 
particular type of outcome.” In light of this, social mechanisms can be indi-
viduated partly in terms of particular outcomes that social practices have. The 
outcomes that are relevant in this context are the effects social practices have 
on people’s freedom.
Talk in terms of social practices is too coarse-grained to adequately iden-
tify group freedoms. Consider the labor market once again. This practice has 
a wide range of outcomes, including hiring and firing. If the goal is to single 
out gender discrimination within this practice, one needs a more fine-grained 
description of this process within that practice. In this case, the relevant out-
come is a skewed hiring pattern. This can presumably be explained in terms 
of particular features of the schemas on the basis of which many participants 
act. In the process, the category of females is transformed into the social 
group of women. As the excluding effect is limited to women, the mechanism 
at issue is group-specific.
As an example of a social mechanism that features inscriptive schemas, 
consider hooligans. They often prevent nonviolent soccer fans from peace-
fully watching soccer matches. However, they also enable each other to 
engage in certain forms of violence. According to Ramón Spaaij (2008, 373), 
one feature of the inscriptive schema of “self-styled hardcore” soccer 
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inscriptive schemas different groups of hooligans rely on: “Self-confessed hooligans 
construct their own meanings in rather flexible ways that often contradict popular 
perceptions of hooliganism” (Spaaij 2008, 370).
hooligans in Western Europe “is their involvement, to varying degrees, in 
violent confrontation with opposing hooligans.” One group’s freedom turns 
out to be another group’s unfreedom.12
These two examples reveal that group-specific mechanisms explain how 
processes of exclusion and inclusion make people unfree or free. Talk in 
terms of social practices does not suffice for this purpose, as the notion of a 
social practice is too coarse-grained. A particular social practice can harbor 
many causal processes and can give rise to various freedoms and unfree-
doms. I call this “the individuation argument” for social mechanisms.
The second advantage of the social mechanism account of group freedom 
consists of its explanatory virtues. The notion of a social mechanism can 
explain why the members of a group are free or unfree. What makes the 
notion of a social mechanism so useful in this context is that it requires being 
explicit about the excluding or including, or constraining or enabling effects, 
as well as the elements, activities, and processes that explain them. 
Individuating a social mechanism in this way reveals the role that social prac-
tices play in the process and makes clear that those affected by them are 
indeed the members of a social group. As a consequence, descriptions of 
social mechanisms are tailor-made for capturing preventing conditions that 
social practices cause or constitute. More specifically, they serve to explain 
conditions of group freedom and unfreedom. Rather than an explanation in 
terms of the job market as such, for instance, the biased effects it has on 
women can be explained in terms of a gender discrimination mechanism.
Another explanatory advantage concerns the fact that a group can be free 
or unfree without all of its members being free or unfree. It need not be the 
case that all members suffer when a group is discriminated against. 
Discriminatory practices typically make it less likely that members of the 
relevant group get certain kinds of jobs. They need not make it impossible. 
Some members might, for instance, have special skills that are in high demand 
such that employers make an exception. It might also be that some are just 
lucky. Thus, social mechanisms can be group-specific without necessarily 
affecting all the individual members. Social mechanisms typically give rise 
to tendencies rather than exceptionless regularities. When this is the case, the 
correlation between group membership and disadvantage will not be uniform 
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anisms often provide information that can be used for the purpose of intervention. 
They can contribute to understanding how things could be changed, in particular how 
a group can be made free. The more detailed the specification of a mechanism is, the 
more helpful it will be for policy.
(Haslanger 2004). Hence, being a group member need not, as such, be suffi-
cient for being disadvantaged.
Even though it need not be uniform, the correlation between group mem-
bership on one hand and constraints or enablements on the other hand should 
be nonaccidental. Furthermore, group membership should be causally rele-
vant to being advantaged or disadvantaged. These ideas can be captured by 
explicating causal relevance in terms of difference making (Lewis 1973; 
Woodward 2003). According to a difference-making account, causal relation-
ships are robust regularities between properties. A property C that features in 
a particular mechanism is the cause of another property E exactly if C makes 
a systematic difference to E. This in turn means that, were C to occur (other 
things being equal), E would occur, and that, if C did not occur (other things 
being equal), E would not occur either. These counterfactuals reveal why the 
relevant regularities are nonaccidental. It should be emphasized that these 
counterfactuals feature ceteris paribus clauses. This means that there can be 
factors due to which C can occur without E occurring, and factors due to 
which E can occur in the absence of C. In this way, a difference-making 
account can explain why correlations between group membership and advan-
tage (or disadvantage for that matter) are not uniform. This completes the 
explanatory argument for social mechanisms.13
What I have said thus far provides the basis for a framework for models of 
social mechanisms. A model of a social mechanism should identify a particular 
outcome or effect that a social practice has on some group of individuals as the 
phenomenon of interest. Furthermore, it should identify the activities that are 
characteristic of the social practice, as well as the agents and the resources that 
feature in it. Of particular importance are the schemas on which the participants 
in the social practice rely, as well as the triggers that activate them and the activi-
ties to which they give rise. It also specifies the way in which these elements are 
arranged. This serves to shed light on the causal process that gives rise to the 
outcome at issue. A complete account of a social mechanism also explicates the 
process by which schemas are transmitted from one agent to another.
It is natural, at this point, to ask for a more detailed account of social practices 
and social mechanisms. If I were to provide more detail, however, the account 
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14Interestingly, the victims of stereotype threat possess ascriptive schemas that apply 
to themselves. In terms introduced in section 1.2, the ascription group (perhaps every-
body) and the ascriptive group (girls) partially overlap. The schemas are (or at least 
need) not (be) inscriptive. After all, they need not be indexical or self-referential, and 
a fortiori girls need not identify with underperforming.
15Recent discussions of the replicability of stereotype threat suggest that the evidence 
for this phenomenon might be weak and that the size of the effect is likely to be small. 
See https://replicationindex.wordpress.com.
would lose generality. In order to counter the claim that my appeal to social 
mechanisms is vacuous, however, I will provide a (very brief) illustration of 
how a particular mechanism could be analyzed within this framework. As it 
turns out, girls perform worse at math than equally qualified boys, for instance, 
when they are told that girls are worse than boys at math (Spencer, Steele, and 
Quinn 1999). If teachers do in fact project this stereotype, girls may end up hav-
ing lower grades in math. This in turn may block certain opportunities on the job 
market that they would otherwise have had. More generally, task performance 
decreases (outcome) when a negative stereotype (ascriptive schema) is acti-
vated—for instance, by stating that the ascriptive group (social group) performs 
poorly in a particular domain, or by claiming that the test they are presented with 
is diagnostic of differential performance (triggers).14 According to their model 
of stereotype threat, Schmader, Johns, and Forbes (2008) argue that this is 
because agents try to combat the stereotype, which causes them to experience 
physiological stress, to monitor their performance, and to suppress negative 
thoughts and emotions (causal processes).15
This model can be regarded as an account of the stereotype threat mecha-
nism. It features quite a few of the ingredients that it should feature according 
to my framework for mechanisms (as indicated). As are all accounts of par-
ticular social mechanisms that I am familiar with, it is however incomplete. 
What is particularly noteworthy is that it remains completely silent about the 
transmission of schemas. This is in fact quite common. It presents one of the 
biggest challenges for accounts of social mechanism (Turner 1994). As men-
tioned in note 4, it might be that the transmission process can be accounted 
for in terms of Dan Sperber’s (1996) theory of cultural evolution and/or Ian 
Hacking’s (1999) theory of classificatory looping.
2.2. The Social Mechanism Account of Group Freedom
Given this explication of social practices, social groups, and social mecha-
nisms, I am now in a position to present a definition of group freedom:
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16Griffin (2008, 273-75) takes it to support skepticism about group rights.
17See Sawyer (2002, 2003) and List and Spiekermann (2013) for explanations as to 
how social phenomena can be ontologically irreducible even if they are enacted by 
individual agents. See Haslanger (2015) for an epistemologically nonreductionist 
view of structural explanation that fits well with my approach.
A group freedom is a freedom that an individual possesses due to a social 
mechanism.
This definition is value-neutral and does as such not feature any group-
specific valuations. As such, the proposed account facilitates an unam-
biguous separation of descriptive and normative matters. Perhaps the 
most striking feature of this account of group freedom is that it treats 
group freedom as a subclass of individual freedom. Group freedoms are 
held and exercised by individual agents. This can be made more apparent 
by reformulating the definition just presented as follows: the freedom that 
an individual possesses is a group freedom if and only if that individual 
possesses it due to a social mechanism. This is the individual-agency the-
sis that I discussed in section 1.1. Thus, the social mechanism account 
provides a precise albeit minimal interpretation of the phrase “being (un)
free as a group.” It reveals that the individual-agency thesis does not sup-
port skepticism about group freedom.16 The relevant groups are ascriptive 
and inscriptive groups. The definition captures the way in which group 
membership is relevant to group freedom while preserving the idea that 
the agency involved is individual rather than group agency. The core idea 
underlying the account is that individuals are unfree due to their group 
membership, which is constituted by an ascriptive or inscriptive 
mechanism.
At this point, I should note that the individual-agency thesis does not have 
the reductive implications it might seem to have. Whether the account is 
reductive or not depends on the notions of a social practice, a social group, 
and a social mechanism. And I have remained silent about the question 
whether they can be reduced to individuals, their properties, and their actions. 
Ascriptive and inscriptive processes might resist reduction, just as processes 
of socialization do. My project is not at all motivated by strong reductionist 
inclinations. The key point is instead that group (un)freedom is a structural 
phenomenon, which (ordinary) individual freedom need not be. The upshot is 
that both (ontological) reductionists and nonreductionists can embrace the 
account.17
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18Kramer (2003) argues that ordinary individual freedom is a nonbivalent notion. On 
his conception, only someone who is in principle able to perform a particular action 
can be free or unfree to perform it, and an in principle able person is unfree exactly if 
she is prevented from performing it. This entails that someone who would not be able 
to perform the action even if he were not prevented from doing so is neither free nor 
unfree. The nonbivalence of group freedom is orthogonal to the issue Kramer is con-
cerned with. Rather than the role of ability, it concerns the fact that a group-specific 
preventing condition turns an individual unfreedom into a group unfreedom.
A second and related feature of the definition is that it entails that group 
freedom and group unfreedom are contraries rather than contradictories. In 
other words, group freedom is a nonbivalent notion.18 Complementing the 
definition of group freedom with one of group unfreedom serves to make this 
point:
A group unfreedom is an unfreedom that an individual possesses due to a social 
mechanism.
Reformulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, the definition 
is as follows: the unfreedom that an individual possesses is a group unfree-
dom if and only if that individual possesses it due to a social mechanism. 
Consider what happens when a group unfreedom dissolves. It is natural to 
think that a group freedom comes into existence at that point. This, however, 
need not be the case.
The point can be illustrated in terms of two ways of fighting gender dis-
crimination: first, by introducing a new gender-specific mechanism that tar-
gets women only, such as a quota for women, and second, by changing the 
existing mechanism that causes discrimination and making it gender neutral. 
The thing to see is that the first option creates group freedoms, whereas the 
second option generates ordinary individual freedoms. The second option 
creates a level playing field. As women face neither group-specific exemp-
tions, nor group-specific enabling conditions, their freedoms are (ordinary) 
individual freedoms. Similarly, when hooliganism ceases to be a popular pas-
time, the relevant group unfreedoms go out of existence, and everybody 
becomes free individually to peacefully watch soccer matches. When a group 
unfreedom is eradicated, it depends on the means by which this is achieved 
whether or not it is replaced by a group freedom. This is the case only when 
group-specific rather than generic means are used in the process. This will 
become important in section 4.1 when I discuss ways of resolving group 
unfreedoms that are caused by ascriptive processes.
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Recall that according to the conception of a social mechanism that I 
presented in section 2.1, the relation between group membership on the 
one hand and inclusion or exclusion on the other hand is not a determinis-
tic relation. All that I require is that there be a nonaccidental correlation 
between group membership and exclusion or inclusion. Due to this fea-
ture, it may indeed be that, for instance, women are discriminated against 
as a group, even though some women are not prevented from doing any-
thing they wish. The upshot is that a freedom or unfreedom can be a group 
freedom or unfreedom, even if not all members of the group possess it. 
This is in fact why I do not characterize group freedom as the freedoms 
that group members possess. Instead, I say nonambiguously that (only) 
those individuals who enjoy a certain group freedom possess it due to their 
group membership.
One might object to the proposed account by pointing out that social 
advantages and disadvantages typically have many causes. As such, they may 
also involve multiple mechanisms. One and the same effect can indeed have 
multiple causes. Consider once again the fact that women perform worse than 
men on the labor market. This could be due to ascriptive schemas that link 
bodily features of females to subordination, as Haslanger has it. A similar 
effect could be generated by stereotype threat. To mention a third possibility, 
it could also be a side effect of sexual objectification.
How (if at all) should the proposed account be changed in order to 
accommodate this? It could be remedied by referring to whatever mecha-
nisms that include or exclude a particular group. The problem with this 
suggestion is that it might be taken to trivialize the proposal. I am not 
convinced, however, that this is indeed the case. Applying the social 
mechanism account requires extensive empirical research. In light of this, 
“whatever mechanisms that include or exclude a particular group” is a 
placeholder for a particular set of causal processes that are simultane-
ously operative in a specific context. Once these processes have been 
explicated, the account is far from trivial.
The causal processes that a social mechanism should capture depend on 
the description of the relevant group freedom. Many processes bear on the 
obstacles women face in the labor market. However, the fact that few con-
struction workers are women requires a different explanation than the fact 
that women in managerial positions face a glass ceiling. Often more con-
crete descriptions of a group freedom require more fine-grained analyses 
that invoke fewer causal processes. Even so, it remains an empirical ques-
tion how many processes should feature in a mechanism that explains a 
group freedom.
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19Public goods are also jointly produced and nonrivalrous (consumption by one per-
son is not in competition with consumption by others).
20Against the background of Raz’s (1986) theory of collective rights, Jones argues that 
group rights are rights “held by a group rather than by its members severally.” (1999, 
354) By this he means that, given that such rights are justified by the interests of more 
than one individual, each member holds the right conditional on other individuals 
holding it. He does not deny that at least some of the rights to public goods are exer-
cised by individuals (think, for instance, of the right to clean air).
21Just as public goods, participatory goods are nonexclusive and jointly produced. In 
contrast to public goods, they are necessarily consumed and produced by the same 
people on the same occasion (Reaume 1988).
3. Collective Objects of Freedom
According to the social mechanism account, group freedom is to be charac-
terized in terms of social mechanisms that give rise to group-specific prevent-
ing conditions. As I mentioned in section 1.1, what is special about group 
freedom might instead be its object. I criticize this suggestion here. Doing so 
will serve a constructive purpose, that of checking whether the scope of the 
social mechanism account of group freedom is adequate. The question at 
issue is whether the conception is sufficiently broad without being too broad, 
that is, whether it classifies those freedoms that are plausibly regarded as 
group freedoms and excludes those that are best regarded as mere individual 
freedoms.
Joseph Raz (1986) and Denise Reaume (1988) have proposed accounts of 
group rights that could be used as a point of departure for accounts of group 
freedom. Raz (1986, 208) suggests that rights to public goods are group 
rights, “collective rights” in his terminology. A public good is nonexclusive: 
if one person has access to it, everybody does. This holds, for instance, for 
national defense and for clean air.19 Raz’s reason for focusing on public goods 
is that, on his view, rights to such goods are to be justified in terms of collec-
tive interests, the interests of a group of people. One might suggest that the 
notion of group freedom should similarly be restricted to the freedom to use 
public goods.20 Denise Reaume criticizes Raz arguing that, as they can be 
consumed by individuals, the rights with which he is concerned are not suf-
ficiently “groupy” in order to be regarded as group rights. She proposes to 
explicate the notion of a group right in terms of what she calls “participatory 
goods,” such as friendship or a language. The key characteristics of a partici-
patory good are that it is enjoyed together and that this is partly constitutive 
of its value (Reaume 1988, 10-11; see also Waldron 1993).21
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22See also Waldron (1987) and Jones (1999) Whereas a language is nonrivalrous, 
friendship is not.
23It is also produced and consumed by different people.
24For other criticisms of Raz and Reaume, see Jones (1999), Morauta (2002), and 
Griffin (2008).
An account of group freedom that is restricted either to public goods or to 
participatory goods is both too broad and too narrow. First, it misidentifies 
some individual freedoms as group freedoms. A public good such as clean air 
is consumed individually. And the right to this good is an individual right—
based in a right to basic health (Griffin 2008, 258). In light of this, the free-
dom to consume air is best regarded as an individual freedom. And even 
though it is a participatory good, people are free individually to initiate, 
maintain, and end a friendship. As another example, consider the freedom to 
participate in a democracy. A proper democracy includes all citizens of a 
country. In this respect, democratic participation resembles a public good. 
Even though the sense in which it is jointly produced is limited, Griffin (2008, 
261) regards it as a participatory good. Perhaps, then, it should be regarded as 
a group freedom on both proposals. However, just as democratic rights are 
individual rights, the freedom to enjoy the good of democratic participation 
is an individual freedom (Griffin 2008). Thus, neither the nonexclusivity of a 
good nor the fact that it is enjoyed together is a sufficient condition for group 
freedom.22
Second, neither of these features is necessary for a freedom to be a group 
freedom. Both proposals are too narrow in that they exclude genuine cases of 
group freedom. Consider a religious group that is discriminated against. 
Discrimination is exclusive in that it need not affect all group members. 
Furthermore, it need not be “enjoyed” together. Hence, discrimination is nei-
ther a public nor a participatory good.23 Even so, (structural) discrimination 
can plausibly be regarded as a form of group unfreedom. Thus, these propos-
als fail to accommodate unfreedoms that really are group unfreedoms.24
A third consideration that counts against the participatory account of 
group freedom is that the social mechanism account of group freedom accom-
modates the freedom to enjoy participatory goods. The people who value the 
participatory goods form an inscriptive group. Furthermore, exercising a 
group freedom is a matter of participating in a social practice. At least in 
some cases, the value of doing so may depend on the fact that people partici-
pate in the practice together. Note, however, that the notion of group freedom 
should not be restricted to inscriptive groups. The upshot is again that the 
428 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47(6) 
25In addition to the relational and nominal models mentioned in note 9, Killmister 
(2011) distinguishes a participatory model of social groups that concerns groups 
involved in social practices that constitute shared meanings. Such practices provide 
so-called participatory goods, such as language and initiation rites.
26He also denies that it is of fundamental normative significance, which implies that 
he rejects Raz’s theory of collective rights. Miller (2002a, 185) maintains that “it 
seems wrong that numbers should matter in this way.” He argues that the interests of a 
single individual justify the relevant rights, and that numbers matter only with respect 
to their feasibility.
27Hence, the argument generalizes to a conception on which group freedoms are free-
doms to perform a shared or joint action (Bratman 1992; Gilbert 1989).
notion of a participatory good is too narrow to fulfill a central role in an 
analysis of group freedom.25
Someone might turn the tables on me, arguing that my approach fails to 
capture the communal nature of the freedoms at issue. Consider ritual slaugh-
ter. Both Jews and Muslims engage in ritual slaughter as part of a social 
practice. The objection could be that the freedom to do so is not fully cap-
tured by mentioning the individual freedoms of Jewish and Muslim butchers. 
The freedom conferred by an exemption to engage in ritual slaughter should 
be understood as a freedom that includes, for instance, communal practices of 
supervision and certification.
I do not believe this objection is successful. Of course, a government that 
has granted an exemption for ritual slaughter will not stop Jews or Muslims 
from developing the relevant slaughtering practices. This, however, is a cor-
ollary of individuals exercising the freedom. Exercising such a freedom is 
conditional on the individual willingness of others to participate in the prac-
tice. This means that it may occur that, despite the fact that you have a right, 
you are not in a position to exercise it successfully. Similarly to when you are 
the only one who wants to protest, this would be due to the contingent cir-
cumstance that others are unwilling to join in.
If this were the crux of group freedom, freedom of association would also be 
a group freedom. As it requires joint action, this freedom can be exercised only 
collectively. Miller (2002a, 181, 183) notes that this entails that the freedom is 
implicitly conditional on collaboration. He denies, however, that this is of fun-
damental conceptual significance (Miller 2002a, 180).26 Freedom of associa-
tion is, after all, a paradigmatic example of (mere) individual freedom.27 The 
upshot is that this approach misidentifies some (ordinary) individual freedoms 
as group freedoms, and, second, that it fails to accommodate freedoms that 
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28Jones (1999, 353) argues that “some longstanding and widely espoused rights, such 
as rights of national self-determination or rights to other forms of collective auton-
omy, cannot be convincingly disaggregated into the rights of individuals.” However, 
successfully exercising the right of national self-determination is in fact a two-stage 
process (Applbaum 2007; Wall 2007). The first stage involves a joint action per-
formed by the members of an inscriptive group, that of forming a group agent. If 
this is open to any inscriptive group, it is an ordinary individual freedom. The second 
stage consists of that group agent governing its members. Whereas individual mem-
bers of a group can initiate a process of self-government, only a group agent can bring 
it to completion.
really are group freedoms. All this supports the claim that group freedom 
should not be characterized in terms of its object. Furthermore, it reveals that, 
given that it aligns with the range of group-differentiated rights, the scope of 
the social mechanism account suits its purpose quite well.28
4. Group Freedom and the Justification of Group 
Rights
The question that remains to be answered is whether the notion of group 
freedom can indeed play a central role in the justification of group rights. In 
order to answer this question, I need to say more about how rights relate to 
freedom. Just like (ordinary) individual rights, group rights can be negative 
or positive. A group possesses a negative right when others are obligated not 
to interfere with the members of the group. The exemption from the motor-
cycle helmet law that Sikhs enjoy in some countries is a case in point. When 
a group possesses a positive right, others ought to enable the group members 
to perform the relevant action. If the members of a linguistic minority have a 
right to education in their own language, for instance, the public education 
system should provide the appropriate means.
This distinction between negative and positive rights runs parallel to the 
distinction between negative and positive freedoms that I introduced in sec-
tion 1.1. Negative freedom consists in the absence of constraints, while posi-
tive freedom is a matter of enablement. Although it is becoming more 
prevalent, my use of the term “positive freedom” is still somewhat idiosyn-
cratic (note 2). In this context, however, it is rather useful, because it serves 
to preserve the parallel between negative and positive rights. Rights serve to 
secure freedoms (Dowding and van Hees 2003). It follows that negative 
rights serve to acquire negative freedoms, and positive rights serve to realize 
positive freedoms (cf. Gosselin 2006).
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The two normative considerations that feature prominently in existing 
defenses of group rights are the value of equality and the value of culture 
(Carens 2000; Fraser 1989; Kymlicka 1995, 2001; Miller 2002a, 2002b; 
Parekh 2000; Patten 2014; Raz 1986; Sen 2006; Spinner-Halev 2000; Tamir 
1993; Young 1990). Equality is thought to be relevant because differences 
between groups might constitute illegitimate inequalities. The value of cul-
ture is taken to bear on the rights people have because specific cultural prac-
tices are especially valuable to particular groups, for example, because they 
are conducive to their autonomy.
In what follows I first discuss how what I call “the equality argument” and 
the “value argument” justify group rights. I then go on to show how the social 
mechanism account of group freedom can be used to give further substance 
to these justifications. This serves to support the core conclusions of this 
paper. First, when group unfreedoms are the problem, ordinary individual 
freedoms often provide the best solution. Second, when group freedoms (and 
group rights) are the solution, the underlying problem usually consists of 
individual rather than group unfreedoms.
4.1. The Equality of Freedom Argument
According to the equality argument, group rights are sometimes necessary to 
eradicate inequalities between members of particular groups and other citi-
zens. It can, for instance, be used to defend affirmative action favoring stu-
dents from ethnic minorities. The equality argument is incomplete without an 
answer to the question what kind of inequalities are group rights supposed to 
eradicate. If Jones (1999) is right and group rights are demands for group 
freedom, the point of the group rights that the equality argument supports is 
to eradicate group unfreedoms.
The point of departure of my reconstruction of the argument is the norma-
tive premise that everybody is entitled to some particular range of freedoms. 
The descriptive premise concerns group unfreedom, and states that a particu-
lar social group is deprived of some of these freedoms. These premises sup-
port the claim that something needs to be done to free the members of the 
group that lacks freedom in the current situation. Group rights serve to secure 
such freedom. In this context, they serve to restore equality.
The social mechanism account of group freedom can be used to give fur-
ther substance to the descriptive premise of the equality argument. The source 
of the existing inequality is a social mechanism that deprives a social group 
of some of these freedoms. More specifically, such inequalities will arise due 
to ascriptive schemas. It follows that the unfreedoms that feature in the 
descriptive premise really are group unfreedoms on the proposed account.
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29Thus, the Equality of Freedom presupposes an argument as to why discrimination is 
wrong. See Lippert-Rasmussen (2014) for a discussion of the claim that discrimina-
tion violates the ideal of equal respect for persons.
The fact that particular freedoms are due to a group-specific mechanism 
does not entail that it has to be resolved by means of a group right. Recall 
from section 2.2 that group freedom is a nonbivalent notion. This reveals that 
group unfreedoms can also be eradicated by means that are generic rather 
than group-specific. Note that, when group unfreedoms are dissolved by 
generic means, the resulting freedoms are (ordinary) individual freedoms. 
Rather than relying on affirmative action, universities could target biases in 
the application process in order to create equal opportunities for members of 
ethnic minorities.
In some cases, generic means are in fact to be preferred to group-specific 
solutions. The latter are likely to lead to group-specific differences in advan-
tage, which is the very problem that group rights are meant to solve. A generic 
measure leads to a decrease in the number of actions that are due to a biased 
ascriptive schema. A group-specific measure introduces an alternative ascrip-
tive schema. In this way, it still contributes toward differential treatment. As 
such, it can be regarded as disrespectful (as Carl Cohen argues in his debate 
with James Sterba; Cohen and Sterba 2003). If it is, generic measures are to 
be preferred, and uniformity is to be preferred to difference. Hence, the argu-
ment should include a third premise according to which group rights should 
be introduced only if they provide for the most effective and appropriate 
means of solving the problem of group unfreedom.29
As it is formulated in terms of group unfreedom, I refer to the following 
reconstruction as “the Equality of Freedom Argument”:
1. Equal freedom: Everyone is entitled to some particular range of 
freedoms.
2. Group unfreedom: A particular social mechanism deprives a social 
group of one of these freedoms.
3. No suitable alternatives: There are no more appropriate ways of 
resolving this group unfreedom than the introduction of a group right.
Therefore, the members of the group should have the group right.
In light of premise 3, one might wonder if group rights are ever justified. 
Even if group-specific solutions are rarely ideal, it may well be that it is in 
some cases justified to introduce them. Ascriptive schemas can be very 
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30Advocates of exclusive or hands-off neutrality such as Barry (2001) will deny the 
political significance of group-specific valuations of social practices. In light of this, 
the argument should be taken to presuppose inclusive neutrality or neutrality as even-
handedness (Carens 2000; Patten 2014; Pierik and Van der Burg 2014).
resistant to change, in particular when they are implicit. Jules Holroyd (2012, 
282) argues that people do not directly control the implicit attitudes they 
have. To be sure, people can exert some influence on the extent to which they 
are manifested in behavior. However, the extent of this kind of indirect con-
trol is rather limited. Because of this, affirmative action may be a reasonable 
alternative or complement to changing people’s biases. Even so, the Equality 
of Freedom Argument reveals that, even though group unfreedoms are the 
problem, group freedoms need not be the solution.
4.2. The Value of Freedom Argument
The value argument supports group rights in terms of the claim that specific 
cultural practices are especially valuable to particular groups. Sikhs, for 
instance, regard wearing a turban as central to their way of life, which 
explains why they want exemption from laws that prohibit this when riding a 
motorcycle. The normative premise of the argument concerns group-specific 
valuations of cultural practices, and states that the fact that some cultural 
practice has special value to the members of a group counts in favor of them 
being in a position to engage in that practice. Such group-specific valuations 
might be politically significant, because of their relation to autonomy or per-
sonal identity (Kymlicka 2001; Margalit and Raz 1990, 447-49; Spinner-
Halev 2000, 324; Tamir 1993, 35-36).30 As these valuations are inscriptions, 
the value argument pertains to inscriptive groups.
The descriptive premise consists of the observation that the members of 
some social group are not free to engage in a particular cultural practice that is 
of special value to them. Just as in the case of the Equality of Freedom Argument, 
a third premise should be added according to which a group right provides for 
the most appropriate means to solve the problem. In some cases, there will be 
group-independent or public reasons for banning the practice, including safety, 
health, or animal welfare. In other cases, there may be group-specific objections, 
for instance, when a group oppresses its members. In order for the argument to 
support a group right, the political significance of the group-specific valuations 
should outweigh that of the generic reason against it. These considerations sup-
port the following reconstruction of the value argument:
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1. Value of freedom: The fact that some social practice has special value 
to the members of an inscriptive group counts in favor of their being 
free to engage in that practice.
2. Individual unfreedom: The members of some inscriptive group are 
not free to engage in a particular practice that has special value to 
them.
3. No suitable alternatives: There are no more appropriate ways of 
resolving these individual unfreedoms than the introduction of a 
group right.
Therefore, the members of the group should have the group right.
When a group right is in place, the inscriptive schemas of the group mem-
bers will give rise to the activities that are characteristic of the social practice 
at issue. This means that the resulting freedoms will be group freedoms. 
Hence, group freedom plays a role in this argument because the group right 
that features in the conclusion secures a group freedom. In light of this, I refer 
to it as “the Value of Freedom Argument.” According to this argument, group 
rights can suitably be justified in terms of the group-specific valuations of 
social practices.
Even though group rights can indeed be seen as demands for group free-
doms, this does not imply that the Value of Freedom Argument justifies group 
rights in terms of group unfreedoms. In fact, in the situation before a group 
right is introduced, everybody is equally unfree. A generic prohibition of 
drugs, for instance, not only affects the members of the Native American 
Church and their practice of consuming peyote. And in a situation in which 
no exemption is made for Jews and Muslims, nobody is allowed to engage in 
ritual slaughtering practices. What makes the relevant groups special is not a 
group-specific unfreedom, but group-specific valuations of particular social 
practices. Thus, the Value of Freedom Argument supports a diagnosis that is 
in a sense the opposite of that of the Equality of Freedom Argument. Whereas 
in the latter case group unfreedoms are the problem and the preferred solution 
is often a generic one, in the former case group unfreedom is not the problem 
while group freedom is the solution.
Consider language rights as another example. Some Flemish-speaking 
parents live in Wallonia, the French-speaking part of Belgium. As Wallonia 
only provides education in French, they lack the freedom to have their chil-
dren educated in Dutch. However, this is also true of French-speaking parents 
in Wallonia. In the sense at issue, then, the Flemish parents are just as free as 
other people in Wallonia. When the freedom at issue is specified in terms of 
access to education in a particular language, all inhabitants of Wallonia are 
individually free.
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At this point, someone might want to rescue the idea that group unfree-
doms justify group rights when the value of culture is at issue. It seems, after 
all, intuitive to say that inscriptive groups suffer from group unfreedom. This 
intuition can be captured by invoking a preference-dependent conception of 
freedom according to which an agent is free if he is not constrained from or 
enabled to do what he wants. A disadvantage of doing this is that the implied 
conception of group freedom does not explain why some people are free or 
unfree as a group. According to the social mechanism account, this is 
explained in terms of group-specific conditions. This explanation is inconsis-
tent with a preference-dependent conception of group freedom, because such 
a conception entails that a group can be unfree in the face of a generic ban 
(such as a generic prohibition of drugs).
This suggestion also fails to capture some of the group unfreedoms from 
which ascriptive groups can suffer. Imagine that women would not ascribe 
significance to jobs they cannot get. This does not show that there is no injus-
tice. It may well be that they are discriminated against. What is more, they 
might have adapted their preferences in the face of such discrimination. It 
could be that this blinds them to the fact that they are unfree as a group. A 
definition of group freedom that refers to the preferences people have would 
not allow for these thoughts.
The upshot is that the Value of Freedom argument does not justify group 
rights in terms of group unfreedoms. Instead, such rights are justified in terms 
of group-specific valuations of social practices and the significance they have 
for the autonomy or identity of members of inscriptive groups.
5. Conclusion
According to the social mechanism account of group freedom presented here, 
social categorization often gives rise to processes of inclusion or exclusion 
and thereby to freedom or unfreedom. As they are specific to inscriptive or 
ascriptive groups, they can usefully be seen as group freedoms or group 
unfreedoms. I have argued that the freedom that an individual possesses is a 
group freedom if and only if the agent possesses it due to a social mechanism. 
Thus, a group freedom is an individual freedom that the agent owes to her 
group affiliations.
On the proposed definition, the notion of group freedom is nonbivalent 
and value-neutral. The former entails that, when generic measures are used to 
remove a group-specific preventing condition, the resulting freedoms are 
ordinary individual freedoms. The latter implies that, when they face a 
generic ban, the members of a social group are unfree even if it removes an 
option that has special significance only to them.
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Group rights can be justified in terms of the value of equality and the value 
of culture. I have used the social mechanism account of group freedom to 
reconstruct these two types of arguments as the Equality of Freedom 
Argument and the Value of Freedom Argument. The former targets group 
unfreedoms, but will often support generic measures rather than group rights. 
The latter favors group rights as a means for realizing group freedoms, but 
justifies them in terms of individual unfreedoms (that bear on people’s auton-
omy or identity). This reveals that, although group rights can be seen as 
demands for group freedom, group unfreedoms rarely justify group rights. In 
other words, group unfreedom can be the problem and group freedom can be 
the solution, even though group freedom is rarely the solution to existing 
group unfreedoms.
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